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THE FOURTH R-RESPECT: COMBATTING PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
HELENA K. DOLAN*
INTRODUCTION
"[O]ffensive touching of [two females'] breasts and genitalia,
sodomization and forced acts of fellatio" allegedly continued for a pe-
riod of approximately five months.' Reported attempts to touch a fe-
male's breasts and vaginal area accompanied by sexually suggestive
comments spanned a similar time frame.' Bra snapping, breast grab-
bing, shoving and name calling topped the list of alleged sexual misbe-
havior that another female regularly endured for close to seven
months.3
As lurid accounts of sexual harassment continue to unfold with star-
tling frequency,4 the scenarios remain largely the same with one strik-
ing variation. The above detailed instances of sexual harassment
reflect the experiences of America's school children.5 Females con-
tinue to be the most frequent targets of harassment,6 and males persist
* I am grateful to Professor Tracy E. Higgins for reading an initial draft of this
Note.
1. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1366 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
2. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., No. C.A.94-140-4MAC(WDO), 1994
WL 477195, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 1994).
3. Tamar Lewin, Students Seeking Damages for Sex Bias: School Officials
Around Nation View Lawsuits With Trepidation, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1994, at B7.
4. See infra notes 36-63 and accompanying text.
5. See D.R., 972 F.2d at 1366; Davis, No. C.A.94-140-4MAC(WDO), 1994 WVL
477195, at *1; Lewin, supra note 3, at B7; see also Nan Stein, Sexual Harassment: 'It
Breaks Your Soul and Brings You Down', N.Y. Teacher, Oct. 18, 1993, at 23 (quoting
several female teenagers who described sexual harassment by other students).
The National Advisory Council on Women's Educational Programs defined aca-
demic sexual harassment as "the use of authority to emphasize the sexuality or sexual
identity of the student in a manner which prevents or impairs that student's full enjoy-
ment of education benefits, climate, or opportunities." Monica L Sherer, Note, No
Longer Just Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX for Peer Sexual Harassment,
141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2119, 2127 (1993) (quoting Massachusetts Board of Education,
Who's Hurt and Who's Liable: Sexual Harassment in Massachusetts Schools 9
(1986)). School sexual harassment occurs at both a teacher-to-student level and a
student-to-student (peer) level. Id. The subject of this Note is peer sexual
harassment.
6. As is the case in workplace harassment, females are the most frequent victims
of harassment in school. Studies indicate that, in both employment and school harass-
ment cases, females are harassed more often than males. In a 1980 federal employee
study conducted by the U.S. Merit Protection Service Board, 15% of males and 42%
of females revealed that they were harassed on the job. Ellen Bravo & Ellen Cassedy,
9 to 5 Guide to Combatting Sexual Harassment: Candid Advice from 9 to 5, The
National Association of Working Women 4-5 (1992). A follow-up survey in 1987
yielded nearly identical results. Id In a 1990 study polling 20,000 military employees
by the Department of Defense, 64% of females and 17% of males said that they had
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as the aggressors.7 But school sexual harassment poses a unique
threat. Secondary, intermediate and elementary school students are
the victims and, even more disturbingly, the perpetrators.8
While instances of teacher-to-student sexual harassment are an im-
portant concern, 9 peer sexual harassment takes place with far greater
frequency, 10 and its consequences are more severe.11 Sexual harass-
ment at the student-to-student level directly impacts the emotional
and behavioral development of children,' 2 and sets the stage for how
they will treat each other as adults.' 3 The danger is not only that stu-
dents are subjected to sexual harassment in school,' 4 but that condi-
tioned acceptance of this behavior also encourages workplace
harassment and domestic violence.' 5 Following the lead of women in
the workplace, female students are challenging the "normalcy" of this
behavior. 6
The present and future welfare of America's students depends upon
prompt corrective action. Continued adult inattention to instances of
peer sexual harassment' 7 and dismissal of sexual misconduct as harm-
less adolescent flirtation' 8 perpetuate the problem. Recognition of a
special relationship between school officials and school children would
impose an affirmative duty of protection on school officials in cases of
been victims of harassment. Id. For a discussion of the frequency of female harass-
ment in school, see infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
7. In the workplace setting females are subjected to harassment most frequently
by male fellow employees. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (Yale Univ. Press 1979). Similarly, the sexual
harassment that female students suffer is most often at the hands of male peers. For
further discussion of female student harassment by male aggressors, see infra notes
42-46, 49-63, 67 and accompanying text.
8. See discussion infra part I.
9. See John Hildebrand, Sex Abuse in Schools LI Study: Reports Often Doubted
When Accused Is Well-Liked, Newsday, Nov. 7, 1993, at 6 (discussing the dangers
posed by teacher-to-student sexual harassment).
10. American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, Hostile
Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools 11 (1993)
[hereinafter AAUW Survey].
11. See infra notes 64-113 and accompanying text.
12. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 16-18.
13. Stein, supra note 5, at 23 (noting that "schools may be the training grounds for
domestic violence").
14. See infra notes 27-63 and accompanying text.
15. Stein, supra note 5, at 23; see also Richard Fossey, Law, Trauma, and Sexual
Abuse in the Schools: Why Can't Children Protect Themselves?, 91 Educ. L. Rep. 443,
443 (Aug. 1994) (quoting Raymond Flannery, Jr., From Victim to Survivor: Stress
Management Approach in the Treatment of Learned Helplessness, in Psychological
Trauma 217 (B.A. van der Kolk ed., 1987)) (stating that a victim's tendency to re-
create traumatic situations has been described as "learned helplessness").
16. Jane Gross, Schools Are Newest Arenas for Sex-Harassment Issues, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 11, 1992, at B8.
17. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
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peer sexual harassment. 19 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, liability would be
imposed on school officials for the harm suffered based on a breach of
that official's affirmative constitutionally-based duty to protect school
children. 2°
Courts have given a good deal of consideration to whether a special
relationship exists between public school officials and school children
in the realm of student sexual harassment cases. 21 The debate centers
around the "special relationship" doctrine articulated in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.' The Supreme
Court in DeShaney explained that when the state, by an affirmative
exercise of its powers, so restrains an individual that he is unable to
care for himself, a "special relationship" exists between the state and
individual.' The state assumes an affirmative duty to provide for the
individual's basic needs.2 4 In the school sexual harassment context,
the question is whether the state, by compelling children to attend
school through compulsory attendance statutes, has cultivated a spe-
cial relationship with the students, and thus assumed an affirmative
duty of protection.' Courts have reached differing conclusions as to
the applicability of the special relationship doctrine in school sexual
harassment cases. 26
This Note argues that a special relationship exists between school
officials and school children, and school officials thus have an affirma-
tive duty to protect students against peer sexual harassment. Part I
discusses the problem of peer sexual harassment, its pervasiveness in
America's schools, and its impact on female students in particular.
Part II analyzes the special relationship doctrine enunciated in
19. For a discussion of the mechanics of the special relationship doctrine, see infra
notes 116-31 and accompanying text.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides, in pertinent part:
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
21. See infra notes 136-64 and accompanying text.
22. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
23. Id. at 199-200.
24. Id. at 200.
25. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1370 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
26. While the Third and Seventh Circuits have held that no special relationship
exists between school officials and school children, D.9., 972 F.2d at 1373; J.O. v.
Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990), the Fifth
Circuit has not gone this far. See Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 529
(5th Cir. 1994). After an interesting line of cases, the Fifth Circuit refused to conclude
"that no special relationship can ever exist between an ordinary public school district




DeShaney. Part III examines the DeShaney Court's rationale and fo-
cuses on the special relationship doctrine's applicability in the public
school setting. Part IV proposes a "reasonable foreseeability" stan-
dard of review in determining school official liability under the special
relationship doctrine in cases of peer sexual harassment. This Note
concludes that students have a constitutional right to affirmative state
protection in public schools under the DeShaney special relationship
doctrine, and that a determination of school official liability under a
standard of "reasonable foreseeability" would ensure prompt preven-
tive action against peer sexual harassment.
I. STUDENT-TO-STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE PROBLEM,
ITS PERVASIVENESS AND ITS IMPAcT
A. The Problem
Sexual harassment is typically thought of "in terms of employers or
faculty who say: 'You sleep with me and you'll get a better job or a
better grade.' "27 But sexual harassment in a different context is
reaching an epidemic level.' Students of all ages are subjected to un-
wanted taunting and touching by fellow classmates everyday at
school.2 9 Secondary, intermediate and elementary school children are
equally vulnerable to attack, and increasingly likely to be guilty of
such misbehavior themselves.3" While such instances of peer sexual
harassment occur with startling regularity,31 students, for the most
part, face the problem alone.32 Female victims simply avoid particular
hallways "rather than risk a Tailhook-like gauntlet,"33 and targeted
males attempt to dodge harassers.34 Inevitably, however, both sexes
are forced to endure the misconduct to a large extent.35
27. Jacquelynn Boyle, U.S. Says Indecent Taunting Is Illegal, Detroit Free Press,
May 19, 1994, at Al.
28. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 7.
29. See infra notes 36-63 and accompanying text.
30. Judy Mann, Making Schools Safe for Girls, Wash. Post, May 7, 1993, at E3.
31. Judy Mann, What's Harassment? Ask a Girl, Wash. Post, June 23, 1993, at D26
(noting that a study performed by the Wellesley College Center on Women and the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund revealed that 39% of 4200 girls surveyed
reported suffering sexual harassment every school day).
32. See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
33. Gary Peller, For Girls, High School Sometimes Seems Like a Tailhook, Wash.
Post, July 25, 1993, at C3; see also AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 17-18 (stating that
69% of girls who have been harassed said they avoided the person or persons who
harassed them, and 34% of girls stayed away from particular places in their schools).
34. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 17-18 (noting that 27% of harassed boys
respond by avoiding the perpetrator); Mark Jennings & LaShawn Howell, Blackboard
Jungle '93: Coping With Groping, and Worse Uh, Girls Aren't the Only Ones Getting
Hassled, Wash. Post, July 25, 1993, at C3 (quoting one male high school student who
stated, "I try and ignore it").
35. See infra notes 36-63, 85-102 and accompanying text.
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B. Peer Sexual Harassment's Pervasiveness
In the Spring of 1993, the American Association of University Wo-
men Educational Foundation (AAUW) conducted the first national
survey of adolescent sexual harassment in school.36 The sample con-
sisted of 1632 students, grades eight through eleven in seventy-nine
public schools. 37 The AAUW revealed that eighty-five percent of girls
and seventy-six percent of boys reported that they were subjected to
"unwanted and unwelcome sexual behavior that interfere[d] with
their lives."'38 A fair percentage of students reported sexual harass-
ment by adults,39 but this figure was dwarfed by the number of school
children claiming student-to-student harassment.40 Of the nearly
eighty percent of students who revealed that they experienced harass-
ment, eighty-six percent of girls and seventy-one percent of boys
stated that they were targeted by a current or former student from
school.4 While the statistics are daunting, the detailed accounts given
by harassment victims paint the clearest picture.
At Duluth Central High School in Minnesota, a female student, ru-
mored to be a promiscuous teen, endured harassing remarks daily.42
Over an eighteen month period, she was repeatedly tormented: "Are
you as good as everyone says?" and "What are you going to do it with
this weekend?"43 High school girls are commonly subjected to a
"steady stream of such verbal harassment, often accompanied by lewd
gestures and other sexual remarks"" as they travel school hallways.
The same students describe how "their breasts, genitals and buttocks
[are] grabbed by unseen boys as they pass in the stairwells, and boys
36. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 2.
37. Id. at 5. Students were asked if teachers, students or other school employees
had done any of the following: 1) made sexual comments, jokes, gestures, or looks; 2)
shown, given, or left the student sexual messages or pictures; 3) written sexual graffiti
on bathroom or locker room walls about the student; 4) spread sexual rumors about
the student's sexual activity or orientation; 5) spied on the student while dressing or
showering; 6) flashed or mooned the student; 7) touched, grabbed or pinched the
student; 8) intentionally brushed against the student in a sexual way;, 9) pulled the
student's clothing in a sexual way; 10) blocked or cornered the student in a sexual
way; or 11) forced the student to engage in kissing or something sexual, other than
kissing. Id.
38. Id. at 7.
39. Id. at 10 (noting that of the students who reported sexual harassment, 18%
claimed that they were harassed by a school employee).
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id.
42. Gross, supra note 16, at B8; Harassment in the Halls, Seventeen, Sept. 1992, at
186 (noting that a female high school student was verbally harassed and the subject of
sexual graffiti); Katherine Lanpher, Reading, 'Riling, and 'Rassment, Ms., May-June
1992, at 90.
43. Harassment in the Halls, supra note 42, at 186.
44. Peller, supra note 33, at C3; see also Mann, supra note 31, at D26 (noting that




press[ed] up against them at the water fountains or the lockers."4 5
One female student from a Boston-area high school reported that a
fellow male track team member "grabbed her breasts by way of saying
hello."46 High school boys similarly report "sexual comments, jokes,
gestures or looks"'4 7 and girls "rubbing up" against them or "touching
[their] butts." '48
Instances of peer sexual harassment, however, are not peculiar to
high schools. Rather, students are "most likely" to have their first
experience with sexual harassment at the middle school level of
grades six through nine.49 The pervasiveness of peer sexual harass-
ment in middle schools is confirmed by the results of the AAUW Sur-
vey which revealed that forty-seven percent of harassed students
explained that they were first harassed at the middle school level.50
One female intermediate school student reported being "tripped, spit
on, [and] subjected to hurtful, lewd remarks about her anatomy by
five male sixth-graders."'" Other female middle school students in
Michigan suffered similar experiences. 52 One schoolgirl complained
that a male classmate told her that he wanted to touch her breasts,
and another was teased by a male peer that she had "tiny tits."53 Fe-
males at this age level are taunted about being flat-chested or large
breasted, propositioned to engage in various sexual acts, and, in some
instances, physically restrained so that they must listen to such lewd
remarks.54
Even more startling is that peer sexual harassment is frequently en-
countered by students in elementary schools. At Cedar Ridge Ele-
mentary School in Eden Prairie, Minnesota, a first grade boy
reportedly chased a six-year-old girl off a school bus, shouting a "de-
rogatory sex-related name" after her.55 The bus harassment, including
repeated crude references to the student's genitalia and sexually sug-
45. Peller, supra note 33, at C3; see also Carlos V. Lozano, Sex Harassment Law
Applies to Students, L.A. Times, Jan. 18, 1993, at 3A (quoting one student who de-
scribed how when she walked in a crowded school hallway, male students grabbed
her); Mann, supra note 31, at D26 (stating that sexual harassment in school includes
touching, grabbing and pinching).
46. Elizabeth Mehren, Sexual Harassment Shows Up at School, L.A. Times, Mar.
25, 1993, at E5.
47. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 8.
48. Jennings & Howell, supra note 34, at C3 (quoting several male high school
boys discussing sexual harassment).
49. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 7.
50. Id. at 7 (noting that of the students who reported harassment, 40% of boys and
54% of girls claimed that they were subjected to the sexual misbehavior in middle
school).
51. Mann, supra note 30, at E3.
52. Karen Schneider, Taunts Costly to Sued Schools, Detroit Free Press, June 2,
1993, at 1A.
53. Id.




gestive remarks by male classmates, continued over the course of a
school year.56 Another six-year-old student at Cooper Elementary
School in Detroit complained to "school officials that four first-grade
boys picked her up, dropped her on a mat and fondled her after gym
class."' 57 In yet another instance, a five-year-old girl reported that she
was led into an art resource room by a male five-year-old, and, once
inside, the boy forcibly pulled down her pants and then his own.58 He
then "jumped on top of her" and "began simulating sexual inter-
course." 59 Harassment at the elementary school level still takes the
form of shoving, touching, sexually derogatory name calling and teas-
ing victims about their sex organs,' but the "incidents are happening
to girls at earlier and earlier ages."'61
Regardless of how old students are or the level of their schooling,
peer sexual harassment is a constant threat. As one commentator
noted, "a Tailhook [is] happening in every school."'62 An even greater
problem, however, is presented by the damaging effects that female
victims suffer after the actual harassment ends.63
C. The Impact of Peer Sexual Harassment on Female Students
While detailed accounts of victims reveal that school sexual harass-
ment is a problem facing all students, females remain the most fre-
quent targets of harassment, and males are the habitual aggressors.64
The AAUW Survey estimated that eighty-five percent of girls and sev-
enty-six percent of boys were subjected to school sexual harassment,
but the gap between instances of male and female harassment wid-
56. Jerry Adler & Debra Rosenberg, Must Boys Always Be Boys? In the Wake of
the Clarence Thomas Hearings, Girls Are Suing to Fight Sexual Harassment at School,
Newsweek, Oct. 19, 1992, at 77; Elizabeth Gleick & Margaret Nelson, The Boys on the
Bus. When Teasing Turned Obscene, Cheltzie Hentz and Her Mother Took Action,
People, Jan. 30, 1992, at 125; Rhonda Hillbery, Taunts on the School Bus Spark Girl's
Sexual Harassment Complaint, L.A. Times, Dec. 1, 1992, at AS.
57. Debra Adams, Girl's Dilemma Shows Harassment Problems: McGriff to Pro-
pose Student Rules Against Sexual Misconduct, Detroit Free Press, Feb. 25, 1993, at
lB.
58. Ruth Shalit, Romper Room Sexual Harassment-by Tots, New Republic,
Mar. 29, 1993, at 13.
59. Id.
60. Mann, supra note 30, at E3; see also Kristina Sauerwein, A New Lesson in
Schools: Sexual Harassment Is Unacceptable, L.A. Tunes, Aug. 1, 1994, at El (quoting
one ten-year-old elementary school female who described how she dodged but often
endured "boys who consistently spit on girls, touched their genitals, screamed obscen-
ities, locked them in chokeholds, kissed them, pinched their behinds and pinned them
to the ground").
61. Mann, supra note 30, at E3 (citing Bernice R. Sandier of the Center for Wo-
men Policies Studies who pioneered research into student sexual harassment).
62. Margaret Lillard, Sexual Harassment Spreads to First Grade; 6-Year-Old Says
Stop, L.A. Times, Oct. 3, 1993, at B4.
63. See infra notes 64-113 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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ened when frequency was considered. 65 While sixty-six percent of
girls and forty-nine percent of boys reported harassment occasionally,
only eighteen percent of males as opposed to thirty-one percent of
females claimed to have been harassed often.66 Further, while fifty-
seven percent of the male peer sexual harassment victims reported the
misbehavior by a female acting alone, and thirty-five percent by a
group of females, eighty-one percent of female victims revealed that
they were harassed by a male acting alone and fifty-seven percent by a
group of males.67
The emotional, educational and behavioral impact of peer sexual
harassment is significant for all student victims, but females suffer the
most devastating effects.68 Research indicates that males and females
disagree not only over what types of behavior rise to the level of sex-
ual harassment, but also over the misconduct's impact on the targeted
individual's self-esteem and productivity.69 The same sexual remarks
that females describe as "intimidating,"70 males characterize as "titil-
lating."'" While female harassment victims report feeling embar-
rassed, self-conscious, less confident and afraid,72 "males [tend to]
perceive sexual harassment as flattery, even if it is unwanted."73
These contrasting viewpoints stem from the social construction of
male and female sex roles.74 As one commentator noted, society de-
fines distinct behaviors, attitudes and pursuits for each sex.75 While
males are socially conditioned to be aggressive, strong and dominant,
females are encouraged to be passive, gentle and submissive. 76 Soci-
65. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 7.
66. Id. A study conducted by the Massachusetts Department of Education con-
firmed that female students are much more likely to be the victims of sexual harass-
ment than male students. Sherer, supra note 5, at 2128 (citing Massachusetts Board of
Education, Who's Hurt and Who's Liable: Sexual Harassment in Massachusetts
Schools 2 (1986)).
67. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 11.
68. Id. at 15-18; Free for All-Hostile Hallways, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1993, at A19.
69. Sherer, supra note 5, at 2132 (citing Massachusetts Board of Education, Who's
Hurt and Who's Liable: Sexual Harassment in Massachusetts Schools 12 (1986)).
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting The Price of Saying No, People, Oct. 28, 1991, at 49); see also
Jennings & Howell, supra note 34, at C3 (quoting one male student who "sort of
like[d]" advances from a female supervisor and tried to respond to them).
72. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 16-17; Patricia Edmonds, 'H' Is for Harass-
ment / Schools Forming Policies, USA Today, Oct. 11, 1993, at 3A (noting verbal and
physical assaults make a young woman feel insecure and ill-prepared to learn).
73. Sherer, supra note 5, at 2132; Jennings & Howell, supra note 34, at C3 (quoting
one male high school student who stated: "I do like certain comments. You know
certain comments are flattering to me. It boosts my ego to have somebody want you
like that...."); Marjorie Williams, From Women, An Outpouring of Anger; Rhetoric
Underscores Deep Divisions in How the Sexes View Harassment, Wash. Post, Oct. 9,
1991, at Al (noting that while harassment results in great intimidation for females,
males largely escape this negative impact).





ety enforces these "dimorphic" sex roles, which privilege men and
subordinate women, as the norms.77 Sexual harassment is a direct
manifestation of these sex roles in action.78 The male perpetrator, a
socialized aggressor, engages in sexual misbehavior unwelcomed by a
female who passively accepts it.79 This "dominance eroticized" rele-
gates females to a position of inferiority.'
The sexually harassed female is twice-victimized. First, she suffers
the emotional distress of the actual encounter.8' Second, the sexual
harassment has a devastating impact on the female's sense of self-
worth.' Female targets of continued harassment begin to accept that
they are "second-class citizens, only valued for their physical attrib-
utes."' 3 Societal mistreatment of complaints, however, reinforces the
misbehavior's acceptability.'
Tragically, female students are frequently but erroneously blamed
for instigating the harassment.85 The victim is made to feel that the
"incident is [her] fault, that [she] must have done something, individu-
ally, to elicit or encourage the behavior, that it is '[her] problem.' "8
Peer sexual harassment often is accompanied by threats of retaliation
if complaints are ever made' as well as total alienation by other class-
mates.'s Consequently, victims are often too intimidated by the possi-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 162.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 16-17.
82. Gross, supra note 16, at B8.
83. Id-
84. See infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
85. Sexual Harassment Widespread in High Schools, Study Finds, LA. Tunes, Jan.
4, 1987, at 26.
86. MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 47 (discussing the impact of sexual harassment on
females in the employment context); see also Gross, supra note 16, at B8 (noting that
one high school girl disliked boys lifting up her cheerleading skirt, yet wondered
whether she had "asked for it" by wearing revealing clothes); Peller, supra note 33, at
C3 (describing how one female student who complained to an assistant principal
about peer sexual harassment was told that she "hadn't said 'no' forcefully enough").
87. Elaine Whiteley, Nightmare in Our Classrooms, Ladies Home J., Oct. 1992, at
80; see also DeNeen L. Brown, Schools Get Tough on Unwanted Touching: 'Boys Will
Be Boys' Is No Defense as Girls Become Aware of Rights, Wash. Post, June 28, 1992, at
Al (quoting one student as saying that many school children do not complain because
they know the harasser would be mad); Gross, supra note 16, at B8 (noting female
students failed to report harassment by male students because the taunting only in-
creased if the females called attention to it).
88. Whiteley, supra note 87, at 83. A young and impressionable student subjected
to harassment by a member of the "in crowd" often becomes lost in the emphasis
placed on peer acceptance. In an effort to maintain popularity, the harassed student
responds to the unwelcome behavior by laughing or dismissing it without complaint.
Jane Gross, Where 'Boys Will Be Boys,' and Adults Are Befiuddled, N.Y. Times, Mar.
29, 1993, at Al. Students interviewed at Lakewood High School admitted that they
were troubled by the behavior of members of a group called the Spur Posse who were
accused of molesting and raping girls as young as age 10. The school children, how-
ever, only agreed to discuss their feelings anonymously because they feared retalia-
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ble repercussions to reject advances, regardless of how offensive they
are. The result is that males who are not challenged by their victims
regarding the appropriateness of their behavior perceive the behavior
as acceptable.8 9 The female seems to "'go along' with sexual harass-
ment, [so the assumption is that she] must like it, and it is not really
harassment at all." 9
The "lack of legitimation of these injuries as injuries" is another
reason why females fail to complain. 91 Male and female students
agree that, in the face of peer sexual harassment, school personnel
rarely take action.92 As one commentator noted, "[t]he nearly univer-
sal feature of all incidents and complaints of sexual harassment in
schools is that they occur in public. ' 93 But negative experiences of
many students are seldom confirmed by school personnel because
most of the adults "do not name [the behavior] as 'sexual harassment'
and do nothing to stop it."94 Instances of harassment are often char-
acterized as "harmless adolescent exploration," and dismissed as
"flirting." 95 Just as this "boys will be boys" attitude sends a message
to girls that they are inferior, it sends a message to harassing boys that
they are privileged.96 Male students equate adult silence with tacit
permission that they may continue to intimidate, harass or assault
tion or the possibility of falling out of favor with the "in crowd." Id. Far more
students defended the Spurs and said that their accusers were promiscuous girls who
wanted to gain popularity and "got what they asked for." Id.
89. Sherer, supra note 5, at 2135; see also Brown, supra note 87, at Al (noting that
schoolgirls "said sometimes the problem starts when girls fail to speak out against
remarks or touching and boys take the silence as a sign of acceptance"); Harassment
in the Halls, supra note 42, at 186 (noting that an eighth grade boy who pulled down a
female student's pants concluded that she didn't mind because she smiled rather than
protested).
90. MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 48 (describing male perceptions in workplace
harassment).
91. Id.
92. Gross, supra note 16, at B8.
93. Stein, supra note 5, at 23.
94. Id.; see also MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 52 ("Trivialization of sexual harass-
ment has been a major means through which its invisibility has been enforced.").
95. Sherer, supra note 5, at 2130 (citing Gross, supra note 16, at B8; Nan D. Stein,
It Happens Here, Too: Sexual Harassment in the Schools, Educ. Wk., Nov. 27, 1991, at
32); see also Edmonds, supra note 72, at 3A (noting peer sexual harassment is often
dismissed as "schoolkid banter"); Peller, supra note 33, at C3 (noting that one princi-
pal admitted that he received "numerous complaints about hallway harassment but
described it as a 'cultural thing'-just the way that hispanic boys let a girl know they
like her"); Putting a Stop to Sexual Harassment, L.A. Times, June 13, 1993, at 23 (not-
ing that school officials and teachers think that harassment "is something little boys
just do, and because they are not considered sexually functional[,] it is harmless");
Sauerwein, supra note 60, at El (quoting one elementary school teacher who stated:
"Boys always tease cute girls and call them names. That's not sexual harassment. It's
called growing up. (Students) are too young to (sexually harass).").
96. Gross, supra note 16, at B8.
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girls. 7 Boys who do not harass, but nonetheless witness the tacit per-
mission to harass, may be tempted to harass girls themselves.9s
The psychological impact of sexual harassment on a female's social-
ized sense of self-worth, coupled with general adult non-response, en-
sures that few complaints are ever made.99 Girls begin to accept that
speaking out will not result in their being heard or believed, so they
learn to endure the harassment privately." They silently attempt to
adjust to this "normal" behavior' 0 ' and begin to distrust the adults
who do not intervene to safeguard their educational environment a 2
The result is grave for schoolgirls. As a female student's self-confi-
dence and motivation declines, 10 3 she becomes unable "to reach her
full academic potential."'" Harassment victims often switch classes
97. Stein, supra note 5, at 23.
98. Id.
99. Peller, supra note 33, at C3 ("[S]tudents who complain [of sexual harassment]
are re-victimized: They are denounced in letters to the editor for bringing the school,
administration and teachers into disrepute, or they are accused of being publicity
hounds who are somehow enjoying themselves."); see also MacKinnon, supra note 7,
at 48 (noting that when no corrective action is taken, "complaint becomes an integral
part of the social pathology of the problem, a further aggravation of the injury of the
incident itself, instead of a potential solution to it").
100. Peller, supra note 33, at C3 (noting that female students have become "so
accustomed to harassment and so convinced of their powerlessness to stop it that,
until recently, they didn't even think to mention it to anyone-it was just part of
going to school"). Students generally do not report sexual harassment to adults. If
they tell anyone, it is a friend. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 14. Only seven per-
cent of the sexually harassed students surveyed said they told a teacher about the
experience, and a mere 23% approached parents with the problem. Id. An additional
23% reported that they told no one. Id.
101. Peller, supra note 33, at C3 ("Most high school girls have, unfortunately,
learned simply to stay silent and take it.").
102. Stein, supra note 5, at 23; see also Sherer, supra note 5, at 2133 (noting that
when sexual harassment is not stopped, school children grow less trusting of people in
general). Schoolgirls responding to surveys have complained that school supervisory
personnel make no attempt to stop harassment or punish the aggressor. Rather, "har-
assment is condoned and the girls who are targets of unwanted attention are left feel-
ing that they are powerless and unworthy of adult protection." Mann, supra note 31,
at D26.
Sexual harassment must be of chief concern to the "academic community in which
the students and faculty are related by strong bonds of intellectual dependence and
trust." Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 Tex. L
Rev. 525, 552 (1987) (quoting Yale University, Report of the Dean's Advisory Com-
mittee on Grievance Procedure 1 (Mar. 1979, rev. May 1980) (unpublished report, on
file with author)). The faculty-student relationship is analogous to the fiduciary-bene-
ficiary relationship. Id A beneficiary places trust and confidence in the fiduciary, and
the fiduciary must act in "scrupulous good faith." I. (quoting B. Dziech & L. Weiner,
The Lecherous Professor 93 (1984)). The student, like the beneficiary, is in a vulnera-
ble position because she puts her trust and confidence in teachers and relies upon
them to maximize her education. Id.
103. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 15-17; see also Boyle, supra note 27, at Al
(noting that one peer harassment victim had nightmares, developed an ulcer and her
grades dropped).
104. Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal.
1993) ("A nondiscriminatory environment is essential to maximum intellectual
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or majors10 5 and increasingly miss school altogether to avoid the be-
havior. 10 6 A resulting poor grade in a particular class may prevent a
female student from enrolling in specific courses or programs, effec-
tively foreclosing certain career paths."° This snowballing effect
''plays an instrumental role in keeping females out of nontraditional
fields of study or employment, such as skilled trades, science, and en-
gineering. ''1°  Ultimately, school sexual harassment deprives female
students of deprives female students of their ability "to partake in the
rights, benefits, services and privileges of schooling that are part of the
promise of our democracy."'0 9 Female sexual harassment victims110
are effectively denied a learning experience free of hostility that male
students, for the most part, continue to enjoy."'
Unless effective steps are taken to address peer sexual harassment,
neither boys nor girls will learn equal relationships," 2 and girls will
continue to be deprived of valuable educational opportunities." 3 As
courts begin to address cases of student-to-student harassment with
greater frequency, an important question is whether school officials
have an affirmative, constitutionally-based duty to protect school chil-
dren against this egregious behavior." 4 The focus of this analysis is on
the special relationship doctrine enunciated in DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Department of Social Services." 5
II. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE
At age four, Joshua DeShaney suffered a series of hemorrhages
caused by traumatic injuries to his head inflicted by his father.' 16 As a
result, he was severely brain damaged."17 Joshua's mother brought a
growth and is therefore an integral part of the educational benefits that a student
receives."); see also AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 15-16 (noting that harassment
victims often do not want to go to school and have trouble paying attention in class).
105. Harassment in the Halls, supra note 42, at 186.
106. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 15.
107. Sherer, supra note 5, at 2153.
108. Id. A Maryland school board equal opportunity official stated, "[situdents are
now coming forward with charges [of sexual harassment], mostly in classes such as
shop and auto mechanics where there are very few of one sex." Kevin Chappell, Tak-
ing Aim At Sexual Harassment School Board Considers Policy, Md. Wkly., Jan. 30,
1992, at M1.
109. Stein, supra note 5, at 23; see also Schneider, supra note 102, at 551 (noting
that a sexually abusive environment prevents school children from receiving the most
that they can from their academic program).
110. See supra notes 64-84 and accompanying text.
111. Harassment in the Halls, supra note 42, at 186; Lanpher, supra note 42, at 90-
91; Peller, supra note 33, at C3.
112. Gross, supra note 16, at B8.
113. See supra notes 103-11 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 136-76 and accompanying text.
115. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).




civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against social workers and
local officials for their failure to remove Joshua from his father's cus-
tody despite their receipt of complaints that he was abused by his fa-
ther."8 The Supreme Court held that the state had no constitutional
duty to protect Joshua.119
The DeShaney Court concluded that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment acts as a "limitation on the [s]tate's power to
act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and secur-
ity."' 2 Its language disallows the state itself from depriving individu-
als of "life, liberty or property without 'due process of law,' "121 but
imposes no "affirmative obligation on the [s]tate to ensure that those
interests do not come to harm through other means.''22
Under certain limited circumstances, however, the Court recog-
nized that the Constitution imposes upon the state an affirmative duty
to protect particular individuals."2 Under the "special relationship"
doctrine, 24 the Court held that when a state affirmatively acts to re-
strain an "individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through in-
carceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty"-the state assumes a corresponding duty to provide for the
individual's "basic needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and reasonable safety."'" The state's affirmative restraint of an indi-
vidual is a " 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the
Due Process Clause."' 26
Although DeShaney provided "clear demarcations" for when an af-
firmative constitutionally-based duty of protection exists between a
state and individual and when it does not, the Court did not offer de-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 201.
120. Id. at 195.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, which applies to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, requires states to provide adequate medi-
cal care to incarcerated prisoners. The Court reasoned that if a "prisoner is unable
'by reason of the deprivation of his liberty [to] care for himself,' it is only 'just' that
the [s]tate be required to care for him." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (quoting
Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926))).
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), extended this duty beyond the Eighth
Amendment. The state also must provide involuntarily committed mental patients
the services necessary to ensure their "reasonable safety" from themselves and others.
Id. at 314-25. The Court noted that "[w]hen a person is institutionalized-and wholly
dependent on the [s]tate-a duty to provide certain care and services does exist." Id.
at 317. Relying on Estelle and Youngberg in its analysis, the Supreme Court articu-
lated the special relationship doctrine in DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-200.
124. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198.




finitive guidance for cases which fall between the two extremes.12 7
Under the special relationship doctrine, the focus is on the involunta-
riness of a custodial relationship between a state and an individual. 128
While the DeShaney Court specifically recognized a state's affirmative
duty of protection in cases of imprisonment and institutionalization, it
"acknowledge[d] that other similar state-imposed restraints of per-
sonal liberty will trigger a state duty to prevent harm."'12 9 Thus, the
question remains whether, in cases which fall short of "involuntary,
round-the-clock, legal custody,"'130 a state, by its affirmative restraint
of an individual rendering him unable to provide for his own basic
needs, still owes that individual an affirmative duty of protection.13'
III. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP AND PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Case History
The special relationship doctrine's applicability in the public school
context is an example of a situation left unanswered by DeShaney.
Student custody, although involuntary, 32 cannot be said to be "full
time"'13 3 and "continuous."'" Several courts, however, have consid-
ered whether a special relationship exists between school officials and
school children. 35
127. B.M.H. by C.B. v. School Bd., 833 F. Supp. 560, 567 (E.D. Va. 1993); see also
Spivey v. Elliott, 1994 WL 419485, No. 93-8269, at *5 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994) (ex-
plaining that circumstances exist "beyond those in Estelle and Youngberg where re-
straint by the [s]tate can create a relationship engendering constitutional protection");
Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that
DeShaney left unclear the "precise measure of state restraint that engenders an indi-
vidual's right to claim a corresponding duty").
128. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201
(1989).
129. Id. at 200; see also D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1379 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (noting
that cases beyond incarceration and institutionalization will trigger a state duty of
affirmative protection), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
130. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1379.
131. Id. at 1370; Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1354 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g en
banc granted, July 1, 1994.
132. See infra note 204.
133. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1371 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
134. Id.
135. For a discussion of case law, see infra notes 136-64 and accompanying text. See
also Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that "compul-
sory school attendance laws do not create an affirmative constitutional duty to protect
students from the private actions of third parties while they attend school"), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993); J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267,
272 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that in a case of teacher-to-student sexual harassment




In D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School,136 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether a special relationship exists in the public school context in a
case involving peer sexual harassment. 137 TWo female students in a
graphic arts class alleged continued harassment by male classmates,
including "offensive touching of their breasts and genitalia, sodomiza-
tion and forced acts of fellatio."' 38 The violent sexual assaults further
included the forced masturbation of the male students two to four
times weekly.13 9 The repeated instances of sexual misconduct, ex-
tending over a period of approximately five months, were allegedly
brought to the attention of a school official, but no corrective action
was taken.14°
Admitting that the case was "certainly a tragedy,"' 4 ' the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals concluded that school officials' authority over
students during the school day does not "create the type of physical
custody necessary to bring it within the special relationship noted in
DeShaney, particularly when... channels for outside communication
[are] not totally closed."' 42 The court reasoned that students do not
depend upon a school to provide for their basic human needs. 43
Rather, parents remain the primary caretakers.'" School children
carry with them the "support of family and friends and [are] rarely
136. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
137. Id. at 1369.
138. Id at 1366.
139. Id. at 1378 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1366. The two female students at Middle Bucks Area Vocational Techni-
cal School were enrolled in the same graphic arts class as the alleged harassers. Id.
The sexual misconduct primarily took place in a unisex bathroom and darkroom, both
of which were attached to the classroom. Id.
141. Id. at 1374.
142. Id. at 1372. Plaintiffs also asserted a claim based on a "state-created danger"
theory. The theory's foundation lies in DeShaney's language that no basis for a consti-
tutional claim exists when the state "had" or "has" played no part in the creation of
harm to an individual, nor did it do anything to render him more vulnerable to harm.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,201 (1989). The
Third Circuit stated that "[Iliability under the state-created danger theory is predi-
cated upon the states' affirmative acts which work to plaintiffs' detriments in terms of
exposure to danger." D.R. by L.L v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch.,
972 F.2d 1364, 1374 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993). But
the court explained that the school defendants' inattention to the misbehavior neither
created the danger in question nor rendered the alleged victims more vulnerable to it.
See id at 1376. While recognizing that the line was "certainly blurred," the court was
"not prepared to say that the conduct charged to the school ... crossed the line." Id.
at 1377. Courts, however, have been more receptive to the state-created danger the-
ory in cases of teacher-student sexual harassment. See, e.g., C.M. v. Southeast Delco
Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1179, 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (concluding that states have an
affirmative duty to protect school children from teacher-to-student sexual harass-
ment); K.L. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1192, 1195-96 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(noting that states must affirmatively protect students from abusive conduct by
teachers).




apart from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any
instances of mistreatment.' '1 45
Less than two months later, a panel of judges from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Jane Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dis-
trict, 14 considered the same question of whether a special relationship
exists between school officials and school children, this time in a
teacher-to-student sexual harassment case. 147 The court agreed that
children are ordinarily incapable of providing for their own basic
needs and rely on parents or guardians as primary care givers, 48 but
reached a different conclusion than did the D.R. court as to the state's
duty of protection. 49 The court stated that "by compelling a child to
attend public school, the state cultivates a special relationship with
that child and thus owes him an affirmative duty of protection.' 150
Children who are separated from their parents during the school day
by force of law are "entrusted" to school officials to provide for their
"safety and well-being.' 5' The resulting "functional custody" is
enough to satisfy the DeShaney standard. 5
The Fifth Circuit later granted en banc consideration. 5 3 Taylor 11,
however, failed to address the question of whether a special relation-
ship exists in the public school setting. 5 4 The court refused even to
consider whether a DeShaney special relationship arises in the public
school context because the issue was wholly irrelevant in a case of
teacher-to-student sexual harassment.155
Since Taylor II, the Fifth Circuit considered the special relationship
doctrine in the public school setting in Leffall v. Dallas Independent
School District.'56 The plaintiffs brought suit when their child was
killed by random gunfire in a school parking lot after a dance, claim-
ing that a special relationship existed between the school district and
their child.'5 7 The court first noted that Taylor II "neither adopted or
rejected the argument that a DeShaney special relationship arises in
the ordinary public school context."'158 The court explained that a
special relationship only arises in "cases involving harms inflicted by
145. Id. at 1373.
146. 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
147. Taylor I, 975 F.2d at 138.
148. Id. at 146.
149. Id. at 146-47.
150. Id. at 147 (citations omitted).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Jane Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993).
154. See Jane Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
155. Id.
156. 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994).
157. Id. at 523.
158. Id. at 529 (elaborating on its reason not to address the special relationship
doctrine in the public school context in Taylor II).
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third parties, and it is not applicable when it is the conduct of a state
actor that has allegedly infringed a person's constitutional rights.' 59
Leffall clearly involved a harm inflicted by a third party rather than
a state actor. The child victim was accidentally shot and killed with a
handgun by a sixteen-year-old student after a high school dance. 16°
Under the specific facts of the case, however, the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that no special relationship existed between the school officials
and student victim because the student was in no way compelled to
attend the dance.161 The court reasoned that "even though [the stu-
dent] may have been compelled to attend school during the day, any
special relationship that may have existed lapsed when compulsory
attendance ended."'6 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not
"conclude that no special relationship can ever exist between an ordi-
nary public school district and its students."'' Rather, the court de-
termined "only that no such relationship exists during a school-
sponsored dance held outside of the time during which students are
required to attend school for non-voluntary activities."'"
While the special relationship doctrine's applicability in the public
school context remains an open question, a recent trend indicates that
an affirmative duty of protection exists in the residential school set-
ting. In Walton v. Alexander, 65 the Fifth Circuit considered the
DeShaney special relationship doctrine in a residential special educa-
tion setting,166 and concluded that a special relationship does exist be-
tween school officials and school children. 67 The court concluded
that a student victim of peer sexual assaults who resided at a school
for the deaf in Mississippi was in a special relationship with the super-
intendent. 6s The court emphasized that the child was in the twenty-
four hour custody of the school, the child lacked normal communica-
tion skills, and the "economic realities" of most Mississippi families
dictated that deaf children's attendance at the school in question was
the only viable option. 69 Therefore, the deaf school child fell within
DeShaney's category of individuals in custody by means of "similar
restraints of personal liberty.' 170
The Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar case in Spivey v. Elliott,'71
involving an eight-year-old student who resided at the Georgia School
159. Id.
160. Id. at 523.




165. 20 F.3d 1350 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g en banc granted, July 1, 1994.
166. Id at 1353-54.




171. No. 93-8269, 1994 WL 419485 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 1994).
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of the Deaf.172 The school child brought a civil rights action against
school officials for their failure to protect the student from continued
sexual assaults by a thirteen-year-old classmate. 73 The court ex-
plained that the student who lived at the deaf school Sunday through
Thursday and spent the remainder of the week at home with his
mother,174 spent the majority of his week at the school and was thus
committed to the "full-time custody of the state.' 75 The court con-
cluded that a special relationship existed, triggering an affirmative
duty of protection similar to the duty recognized in the Estelle-
Youngberg exceptions. 76
B. An Analysis of the Special Relationship Doctrine in the Public
School Context
The "logical" extension of the special relationship doctrine's affirm-
ative duty of protection to the residential school context 77 provides a
proper foundation on which to build. Careful consideration of the rel-
evant factors set out in DeShaney reveals that students who are com-
pelled to attend public school under state law also are entitled to the
full protection of the special relationship doctrine. 78
The DeShaney Court's rationale is "simple enough."' 79 When a
state so restrains an individual's liberty such that he is unable to care
for himself, the state assumes an affirmative duty to protect him.180
Nowhere does the Court state that such a duty only arises in cases of
formal custody.' 8' Rather, the Court conceded that the duty may
arise in cases of "other similar restraint[s] of personal liberty.' '1 82
Thus, as one commentator noted, the focus of the analysis should be
on the "implications" of state control, rather than the control itself,
"because it is the underlying dependency that actually obligates the
state to act, not the state's legal status as custodian.' 8 3 The most im-
portant considerations then are the individual's increased vulnerabil-
ity and exposure to risk as a result of state restraint, rather than the
existence of a formal custodial relationship. 8 Furthermore, the de-
172. 1& at *1.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *5.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *6.
178. See infra notes 179-243 and accompanying text.
179. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989).
180. Id.
181. See id. at 198-201.
182. Id. at 200.
183. Steven F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After




gree of state control is a relevant inquiry, but only as a measure of the
restrained individual's increased dependency.'85
DeShaney's specific reference to incarceration and institutionaliza-
tion' 86 is significant because it provides examples where restrained in-
dividuals are rendered incapable of caring for themselves and thus
depend on the state to provide for their basic needs."8 Formal cus-
tody is the clearest case warranting affirmative protection as a result
of a restrained individual's increased dependency on the state, but it is
by no means a threshold standard."m Public schooling arrangements
may not rise to a level of formal custody, but they nevertheless involve
enough of the factors typically present in such custodial relationships
to qualify as a "similar restraint of personal liberty."' s9
The focus of the analysis in cases of incarceration and institutional-
ization is on the formal nature of the custodial relationship'" because
it is this factor which gives rise to the restrained individual's increased
vulnerability and dependency on the state. 191 In D.R., the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reasoned that "the full time severe and continu-
ous" state control over prisoners or committed mental patients leaves
them "wholly dependent" upon the state. 92 The restrained individu-
als do not have "it within their power to provide for themselves, nor
are they given the opportunity to seek outside help to meet their basic
needs."' 93 The state thus assumes a corresponding duty to protect the
individuals. 94 In cases arising in the public school context, several
courts have emphasized that unlike prisoners or committed mental pa-
tients, school children who return to their homes on a daily basis are
not so restricted that they are effectively denied "meaningful access to
sources of help." 95
185. Id.
186. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200
(1989).
187. Id. at 200 (noting that the state must provide for an involuntarily restrained
individual's reasonable safety).
188. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1379 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting) (explaining that if the
DeShaney Court intended to limit protection to incarceration or institutionalization, it
easily could have done so by using language that read "other similar types of custody"
rather than "other similar restraint of personal liberty"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045
(1993).
189. See Huefner, supra note 183, at 1950; see also infra notes 190-243 and accom-
panying text.






195. Id.; see also Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining
that school custody does not amount to a restraint that prohibits children's parents
from caring for their basic needs), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993); J.0. v. Alton
Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
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In the public school setting, however, the restrained individual's in-
creased vulnerability and dependency on the state do not turn exclu-
sively on the nature of the custodial relationship involved. 96 While
students are clearly not held in school "under shackles,"'" several
other relevant factors figure into the equation. 198 State mandatory at-
tendance laws, the immaturity of the student involved, and the broad
discretion extended by the state to schools in controlling students
"combine to create the type of special relationship which imposes a
constitutional duty on [a school] to protect the liberty interests of stu-
dents while they are in the state's functional custody."' 99
Like incarcerated and institutionalized persons, school children are
put in a position where they lack the power to protect themselves. 200
compulsory school attendance does not render school children so helpless that an
affirmative duty to protect arises).
196. See infra notes 197-233 and accompanying text.
197. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1379 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045
(1993).
198. Fossey, supra note 15, at 443 (citing Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery 74
(1992)) (noting that "sexually abused [students] are quite like prisoners, 'made cap-
tive by the condition of their dependency,' and shackled by confusion, shame, isola-
tion, and fear").
199. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1377.
The concept of "functional" custody originated in Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch.
Dist. (Stoneking 1), 856 F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 489 U.S. 1062 (1989).
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit decided against basing its
decision on a "functional" custody analysis given the "uncertainty" of the special rela-
tionship doctrine after DeShaney. Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist. (Stoneking
I/), 882 F.2d 720, 723-24 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1044 (1990). The court
concluded that it would be more "expedient" to make its decision without reliance on
the doctrine. Id. at 724. The court instead held school officials accountable by relying
on a theory that they, "with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established
and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [an individual] con-
stitutional harm." Id. at 725. Nevertheless, the court stated explicitly that its earlier
discussion noting that "'students are in what may be viewed as functional custody of
the school authorities' during their presence at school... [was] not inconsistent with
the DeShaney opinion." Id. at 723. But in D.R., 972 F.2d at 1372, the Third Circuit
concluded that no special relationship exists between school officials and school chil-
dren in a case of peer sexual harassment. The court stated that state authority over
individual students does not create the type of physical custody contemplated in
DeShaney's special relationship doctrine. Id.
Although the case may be closed in the Third Circuit, the concept of "functional"
custody is not dead. In Jane Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 (5th
Cir. 1992), vacated, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc), a case of teacher-to-student
sexual harassment, the Fifth Circuit concluded that a school child is in the "func-
tional" custody of school officials, and a special relationship thus exists between the
two. Id. After the case was reheard en banc, however, the court failed to address
whether a special relationship exists in the public school context because the doctrine
is not applicable in cases of teacher-to-student sexual harassment. Taylor II, 15 F.3d at
452 n.3. Thus it still remains unclear whether the Fifth Circuit would support the
conclusion that students are in the "functional" custody of school officials. See supra
notes 146-64 and accompanying text.
200. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1371 (noting that incarcerated and institutionalized persons
are incapable of protecting themselves).
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It is well established that children are generally incapable of providing
for their own basic needs, 10 and the law recognizes that their ability
to exercise mature judgment often is not fully developed.2" Parents
or guardians are expected to accept primary caretaking responsibili-
ties.23 But compulsory school attendance laws effectively prevent
parents or guardians from fulfilling their role as protectors during
school hours.' ° A child may be exposed to a multitude of dangerous
situations,2°5 yet lack the mature judgment to address them alone.
Public school children are "not restricted to the same degree as ar-
restees, convicts and patients committed to state mental hospitals,"
but they "are similarly involved in an environment where the state
201. Id. at 1371; Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th
Cir. 1982) (noting that school children are "too young to be considered capable of
mature restraint"), cert denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
202. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1380 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting) (noting that children are rec-
ognized under the law as being incapable of mature judgment), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1045 (1993).
203. Id. at 1371; Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 735 (10th Cir. 1992) (Seymour,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993).
204. The majority of students are mandated to attend school under state law. See
Cal. Educ. Code § 58556 (West 1989); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 298-9 (1985 & Supp. 1992);
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 105, para. 5/26-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Iowa Code Ann. § 299.1A
(West Supp. 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-1111 (1992); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 159.010
(Michie 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:221 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 20-A, § 5001-A (West 1993); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 71, § 22 (Law. Co-op.
1991); Miss. Code Ann. § 37-13-91 (1972); NJ. Stat. Ann. § 18A:38-25 (West 1989);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-2 (Michie 1994); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3205 (McKinney 1981);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (West 1992); W. Va. Code § 18-8-1 (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1994).
Public school attendance is no less compulsory because some students may decide
to attend private school or receive home education. Many families do not have the
financial options to send children to private school or provide home education. D.R.,
972 F.2d at 1380 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting) (noting that the mandatory nature of
school attendance "is not lessened by the fact that a few fortunate students have the
option to attend private school or be educated at home. For the vast majority of
children of school age, this is no choice at all."). An estimated 12% of students at-
tending elementary and secondary schools are enrolled in private institutions. Id. at
1380 n.4 (citing Muriel Cohen, A Schooling Tradition Turns 350 Today, Boston Globe,
Apr. 14, 1992, at 24); see also Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing that the "economic realities" of some families leave only one schooling
option).
Even the minority of students who have reached the age where they are no longer
compelled to attend school still have little choice. Most school children realize that a
proper education directly impacts their prospects for success in the future. See Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992) (noting that high school graduation motivates
students throughout their schooling and promises a graduate "the right and duty to
assume [a role] in the community and all of its diverse parts"). To say that a student
can simply choose not to attend school is unrealistic. Cf. id. (explaining that the con-
clusion that every student has a real choice not to attend their high school graduation,
one of life's most important occasions, "ignores reality" and is "formalistic in the
extreme").
205. For examples of the sexual harassment that children suffer at school, see supra
notes 27-63 and accompanying text.
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[exercises] some lawful control over their liberty."2 6 During school
hours, students are subject to the "broad supervisory and disciplinary
powers"2 "7 of teachers and school officials. School children are re-
quired to attend scheduled classes and assigned to specific lunch peri-
ods. Like incarcerated or institutionalized persons, students must
abide by specific policies, rules and regulations with respect to behav-
ior and discipline.20 8 School supervisory personnel are authorized to
separate pupils or even isolate a particular student as a disciplinary
measure.
209
Elementary, intermediate and secondary school children alike are
often not "sufficiently independent" of school authorities to bring
complaints promptly to their parents.210 Students cannot "simply
walk[ ] out of school without permission during school hours without
calling into play the truancy laws. ' 211 This broad exercise of state con-
trol effectively prevents school children from "voluntarily withdraw-
ing from situations posing [a] risk of personal injury. '2 12
Courts have distinguished the public school setting from foster care
situations where special relationships have been found to exist be-
tween a state and child.213 In D.R., the Third Circuit explained that
the foster care relationship arises out of a state's affirmative act in
placing a child with a "state-approved" family.214 "By so doing," the
206. Maldonado, 975 F.2d at 731 (quoting Hilliard v. City of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516,
1520 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991)).
207. Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982).
208. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1380 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045
(1993).
209. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 16-1-14 (1975) (noting that school children may be iso-
lated or separated from each other as a disciplinary measure).
210. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1380 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1380-81.
212. Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hilliard v.
City of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1520 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991)),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993).
213. Several circuit courts have recognized that a special relationship exists be-
tween a state and a child in foster care. See, e.g., Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of
Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that children in state custody
have "a constitutional right to be reasonably safe from harm," and state actors must
protect foster care children from situations they "know or suspect to be dangerous");
K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing a
child's constitutional right not to be placed with a foster care parent "who the state's
caseworkers and supervisors know or suspect is likely to abuse or neglect the foster
child"); Taylor ex. rel Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794-97 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (explaining that a foster child is in a situation so analogous to that of incarcer-
ated and institutionalized persons that he is similarly entitled to affirmative state pro-
tection), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social
Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1981) (concluding that a child has a constitutional
right to be placed in a foster care setting known to be safe), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864
(1983).
214. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1372 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
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court reasoned, "the state assumes an important continuing, if not im-
mediate, responsibility for the child's well-being."2 ' But by mandat-
ing school attendance, a state similarly places a far greater number of
children in "state-approved" schools.216 It is well recognized that fos-
ter care children are "dependent on the state, through their foster
families, to provide their basic needs including food, clothing, shelter
and medical care." '217 But students during the school day likewise de-
pend on the state to provide for a fifth basic need recognized in
DeShaney, their reasonable safety. 218
Furthermore, while a child is "invariably free to return home" at
the end of the school day,219 it cannot be assumed that help is always
readily available.' 2 For the few hours that a student is home from
school in the evening, a parent or guardian may be unavailable to dis-
cuss the problems that a child encountered at school.2" The Ameri-
can family is no longer comprised of "the breadwinning father, the
housewife mother, and the children."'  Over the past thirty years,
the number of children with divorced parents has increased from one
215. I&
216. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
217. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1372.
218. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989) (recognizing food, clothing, shelter, medical care and reasonable safety as basic
human needs).
219. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1372 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)),
cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
220. In concluding that a special relationship does not exist between school officials
and school children, the Third and Seventh Circuits stressed that the degree of paren-
tal involvement in children's lives is great, and that this control dictates that the state
does not become the primary caretaker when a child is compelled to attend school. Id.
at 1371; J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267,272 (7th Cir. 1990).
221. Even in the fortunate instances where parent caretakers address the sexual
harassment of a child, harm is already done, and still difficult to remedy. The school
child faces initial instances of harassment alone. The conclusion that a student is ade-
quately protected through her capacity to seek help outside of school rests on the
assumption that instances of sexual misconduct will occur at least once, and that they
can be remedied only after damage has been done. See JoAnn Strauss, Peer Sexual
Harassment of High School Students: A Reasonable Student Standard and An Affirm-
ative Duty Imposed on Educational Institutions, 10 Minn. J. Law & Inequality 163
(1992) (noting that steps must be taken to prevent student sexual harassment, "not
just to react once an incident has happened").
222. Sally Wendkosolds, The Working Parents Survival Guide 3 (1983). Over the
past twenty years, the percentage of children that live with only one parent doubled.
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992, at 55 (112th ed.
1992) (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-20, No.
461) (reporting that among all races, the number of children that live with one parent
rose from 12% in 1970 to 25% in 1991). In 1991, it was estimated that approximately
one-fifth of all white children and one-third of all Hispanic children live with only one




in nine to almost one in two.213 Children born out-of-wedlock from
1983 to 1993 "soared by more than 70 percent" to a staggering 6.3
million."2 4 In the resulting single parent homes, financial constraints
often dictate that the parent work extremely long hours.225 When a
child returns home from school, the single parent is often inattentive
to the child's problems or absent entirely.2 6 More and more two par-
ent households experience similar problems. Over the last thirty
years, the percentage of employed married women with children be-
tween the ages of six and seventeen has more than doubled.227 Before
long, an expected three out of four married women will work full-time
outside the home. 2 8 On the basis of these statistics, it is evident that a
vast number of school children do not have access to help simply be-
cause they are free to return home at the end of the school day.
The question remains then how the home environment of public
school children is so clearly different from that of residential school
students who spend weekends with a parent or guardian, but nonethe-
less receive affirmative state protection under the special relationship
doctrine. In Spivey, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a special re-
lationship exists between state school officials and a residential school
child.2119 But the school child in question spent as much time with his
parent caretaker as innumerable public school children do. The stu-
dent lived away from home for five days of the week and spent the
remaining two with his mother.23 ° Public school children similarly
spend time with parents or guardians over weekends, but often not
with much greater frequency during the week." 1 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit distinguished the case from those arising in the normal public
school context, placing great emphasis on the child's status as a "resi-
dential student." 2 But in either the residential or public school set-
ting, the basic problem is the same. Separated from parent caretakers,
223. Neil Kalter, Growing Up With Divorce: Helping Your Child Avoid Immedi-
ate and Later Emotional Problems 1 (1990); Susan Chira, Study Confirms Some Fears
on U.S. Children: Carnegie Panel Sounds Alarm with a Bleak Portrait of Future, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 12, 1994, at Al. Instances of divorce increased dramatically from 708,000
in 1970 to 1,167,000 in 1988. Bureau of the Census, supra note 222, at 90 (citing U.S.
National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics of the United States; Monthly
Vital Statistics Report; and unpublished data).
224. Steven A. Holmes, Out-of-Wedlock Births Up Since '83, Report Indicates, N.Y.
Times, July 20, 1994, at Al.
225. Chira, supra note 223, at Al.
226. Id. (noting that children are deprived "loving supervision and intellectual stim-
ulation" in many cases as a result of divorce and parents' work).
227. Bureau of the Census, supra note 222, at 413 (citing U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Bulletin 2307; Employment and Earnings, monthly).
228. Wendkosolds, supra note 222, at 3.
229. Spivey v. Elliott, No. 93-8269, 1994 WL 419485, at *5 (11th Cir. Aug. 26,1994).
230. Id. at *1.
231. See supra notes 219-28 and accompanying text.
232. Spivey, No. 93-8269, 1994 WL 419485, at *4.
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school children are placed in positions of increased vulnerability, and,
when exposed to risk, they often are unable to secure help. 33
Public schools must ensure that students are protected "from dan-
gers posed by antisocial activities-their own and those of other stu-
dents-[in order] to provide.., an environment in which education is
possible."Z34 A student's inability to address situations of risk during
school hours is magnified when the danger posed is sexual harass-
ment.3"5 Victims of peer sexual misconduct are generally reluctant to
disclose the abuse.3"6 Many sexually harassed students fear the reper-
cussions of a complaint.3 7 Others observe general adult non-response
to instances of harassment and silently attempt to adjust to the "nor-
mal" behavior.3 8 Countless victims are unaware that what they are
suffering even has a name.3 9 When there are "no words to articulate
discontent ... it is sometimes held not to exist. '240
By placing children in positions of increased vulnerability in man-
dating school attendance, the state must undertake the corresponding
responsibility to protect them.24' Children are inherently dependent
233. See supra notes 200-28 and accompanying text.
234. Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting D.R. by LR.
v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1992)
(en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993); see
also Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982) (not-
ing that the state assumes an affirmative duty to protect school children, who are
considered too young to be capable of mature restraint, from dangers posed by other
students), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Strauss, supra note 221, at 163 (quoting
Kimberly A. Mango, Students Versus Professors: Combatting Sexual Harassment
Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 Conn. L Rev. 355, 358-59
n.9 (1991)) ("[A school] serves as the parent and the student's 'home away from
home' for seven or more hours of the day .... ").
235. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1381 (noting that school children facing continued instances
of peer harassment are often themselves incapable of addressing the misbehavior with
mature judgment).
236. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1459-60 (8th Cir.) (noting that sexually abused
children possess a "unique reluctance" to disclose the misconduct), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 828 (1987); Fossey, supra note 15, at 443 (noting that an "abundance of research
[indicates] that child abuse victims are often isolated from parents or peers"). See also
supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text. Ironically, a prisoner, who is probably
more likely to disclose abuses than a child suffering sexual harassment, is protected by
the state, while the child is not. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1381 (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting).
237. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
239. Harassment in the Halls, supra note 42, at 186 (noting that a student victim of
continued peer sexual harassment only learned that she could pursue a cause of action
through the help of her parents).
240. MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 28 (quoting Sheila Rowbotham, Women's Con-
sciousness, Man's World 29-30 (1973)) (describing the position of women when faced
with employment harassment two decades ago).
241. This concept is to be distinguished from the "state-created danger" theory ex-
plained supra note 142. In the public school context, not only has the state exposed
the student to increased risk, but it has also "involuntarily restrained" the student by
virtue of state compulsory school attendance laws. See supra note 204.
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on adults to guard them against the dangers of the world.2 42 As one
commentator noted, these caretakers are often parents, guardians or
relatives, but "in a complex society they must sometimes be teachers
and educational institutions as well."243 Recognition of a special rela-
tionship between school officials and school children would provide
public school students with the affirmative protection that they
deserve.
IV. A PROPOSED MODEL FOR PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
In determining school official liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a
breach of the officials' affirmative duty of protection, victims of peer
sexual harassment would be required to demonstrate by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that school officials failed to protect them from
"known or reasonably foreseeable harms occurring during or in con-
nection with school activities."2 " The harmed school child would
present evidence to establish the nature and frequency of the alleged
harassment, whether the sexual misconduct occurred in the presence
of school personnel, and whether the student victim brought the abuse
to the attention of teachers or other school supervisory employees. 245
The school officials would then have the opportunity to demon-
strate that the harm done to the student victim was not "known or
reasonably foreseeable. '246 An isolated instance of peer sexual har-
assment, for example, would indicate that school officials could not
have reasonably foreseen the misbehavior. A school's preventive
measures, such as implemented sexual harassment policies and educa-
tional workshops, and the student victim's accessibility to counseling
and grievance procedures would also suggest that the sexual miscon-
duct was, in fact, unforeseeable.247 Further important considerations,
242. Huefner, supra note 183, at 1966.
243. Id.
244. The "protection from known or reasonably foreseeable harm" standard was
enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in Taylor before it was withdrawn for en banc consid-
eration. Jane Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 144 (5th Cir. 1992), va-
cated, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
245. In D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Technical Vocational Sch., 972 F.2d
1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993), for example, the
frequency of the two female victims' alleged molestation in addition to the fact that
the misbehavior occurred in the presence of a student teacher would tend to show
that instances of harassment were foreseeable. Id. at 1366, 1378. The complaint to a
school official by one of the female victim's would be an even stronger indication of
the harassment's foreseeability. Id. at 1366.
246. The D.R. school officials would have an opportunity to demonstrate that other
relevant factors revealed that the alleged instances of sexual misbehavior were not
known or reasonably foreseeable.
247. Proper consideration must be given to whether a student victim was aware of
her rights and had access to help. Under such circumstances, a student's failure to
report instances of peer sexual harassment could indicate that the misbehavior was
not known or reasonably foreseeable to school officials. In a hypothetical analysis of
D.R., school officials would demonstrate that clear harassment policies were in place
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however, would include the student victim's age level as an indication
of maturity, and whether the school child is disabled or suffers an im-
pairment that might make the child unable to seek help promptly or at
all 2 4 8
School official liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a breach of the
officials' affirmative constitutionally-based duty of protection would
depend on the strength of the peer sexual harassment victim's eviden-
tiary showing of known or reasonably foreseeable harm, and the
school officials' production of opposing evidence. The nature and fre-
quency of the harassment in addition to the school personnel's aware-
ness of continued instances of misbehavior would be balanced against
the extent of the school's preventive and protective measures and the
school child's ability to understand established policies and pursue im-
plemented procedures.249
This reasonable foreseeability standard of review" ° would provide
school officials with a greater incentive to take preventive action. 5 1
Consideration of relevant factors including student education and the
availability of help in the realm of peer sexual harassment would pro-
vide a strong incentive to schools that have not yet formulated strict
at Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, and counseling services and ade-
quate grievance procedures were made available.
School policies and training activities provide strong evidence in support of a stu-
dent's ability to seek help because they ensure that "students and staff understand
when sexual harassment has occurred and understand how to appropriately deal with
it." Strauss, supra note 221, at 183; see also Maia Davis, Enforced Courtesy: Schools
Say New State Law Has Cut Sexual Harassment On Campus, LA. Times, Jan. 5, 1994,
at B1 (noting that school district policies against student sexual harassment encourage
school children to "complain about offensive behavior or comments that they previ-
ously may have let pass").
248. D.R., 972 F.2d at 1381 (noting that students who are especially young or suffer
disabilities or other impairments deserve affirmative protection); see also Walton v.
Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a handicapped child at
a residential school who "lack[ed] the basic communication skills that a normal child
would possess" deserved affirmative protection).
249. In examining the alleged facts of D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Voca-
tional Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1045 (1993), the female victims would make a strong showing of reasonable foresee-
ability based on the nature and the frequency of the harassment and the school super-
visory personnel's awareness of the sexual misconduct. Id. at 1366. Further, one of
the victims in D.R. was "almost totally hearing impaired" and "[h]er powers of articu-
lation [were] seriously limited." Id at 1381. This student's demonstration that she
could not have effectively made use of available counseling services or school griev-
ance procedures due to her handicap would weigh in favor of school official liability.
250. See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
251. "The key element of prevention is adoption and implementation of clear poli-
cies and procedures" setting out clearly what sorts of behavior constitute sexual har-
assment and will not be tolerated. Strauss, supra note 221, at 183 (citing Billie W.
Dziech & Linda Weiner, The Lecherous Professor- Sexual Harassment on Campus
200 (1990)). Also essential to prevention are clear communication of all policies and
procedures to staff and students, educational workshops designed to help staff and




sexual harassment policies 252 or implemented educational253 and
counseling programs.2 4 Further, with the increased likelihood of lia-
bility under the standard of reasonable foreseeability, 255 school offi-
cials could not continue dismissing reported instances of peer
harassment as insignificant. 6 Adult witnesses to questionable behav-
ior would no longer have the option to avert their eyes or simply con-
clude that the misconduct was harmless. 57 Instead, the standard of
reasonable foreseeability would require school employees to ask
themselves: "Does this behavior constitute sexual harassment, or is it
reasonably foreseeable that it could escalate to that level? '258
The reasonable foreseeability standard used to determine school of-
ficial liability would strike the appropriate balance between the inter-
ests of school officials and school children. Students would benefit
252. Id. at 182-83 (noting that sexual harassment policies and procedures are keys
to prevention).
253. Id. at 183 (arguing that "commitment to a curriculum that specifically ad-
dresses sexual harassment" and "promotes sex equity" is the answer).
254. Wendy Melillo, Calendar-Defusing Sexual Harassment, Wash. Post, Jan. 13,
1987, at Z19 (noting that some schools have implemented policies against student
sexual harassment and set up counseling services).
255. A "reasonable foreseeability" standard would provide greater protection and
incentive for prevention than does, for example, a "deliberate indifference" standard.
The latter is a popular theory of liability posed in cases of violations by state actors.
Victims of teacher-to-student sexual harassment pursue this theory. See, e.g., Jane
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (applying
the deliberate indifference standard in a case of teacher-to-student sexual harass-
ment). Under the "deliberate indifference" approach a student victim must establish
that: 1) a supervisory school official had notice of a pattern of inappropriate sexual
behavior "pointing plainly" toward the conclusion that the student was suffering sex-
ual abuse; 2) the school official demonstrated "deliberate indifference toward the con-
stitutional rights of the student" by failing to take corrective action which was
"obviously necessary"; and 3) the official's failure to take action caused constitutional
injury to the student. Id. Clearly, a school is under less pressure to address instances
of harassment if they have to be on notice of a pattern that points plainly to sexual
abuse as opposed to a standard of reasonable foreseeability.
256. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text. Further, certain state laws
make it easier for teachers and school supervisory officials to address peer sexual
harassment. In California, a state law which took effect January 1, 1993 seeks "to end
sexual harassment by children by allowing school administrators to discipline offend-
ers with the harshest penalty allowable: expulsion from school." Shalit, supra note 58,
at 14. Under the law, peer sexual harassment is defined as "'unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors and other physical, visual or verbal actions of a
sexual nature' that are severe enough 'to have a negative impact upon an individual's
academic performance or create an intimidating, hostile or offensive educational envi-
ronment.'" Id. The law affects students in grades four through twelve. Id. A similar
law is in effect in Minnesota which became effective in September 1991, covering
children down to the kindergarten level. Id.
257. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
258. Teachers and other school employees would undergo mandatory training to
learn to readily identify instances of sexual harassment and respond appropriately.
Strauss, supra note 221, at 183 (citing Billie W. Dziech & Linda Weiner, The Lecher-
ous Professor: Sexual Harassment on Campus 200 (1990)).
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from both the greater protection offered under the law259 and their
schools' increased commitment to prevention.2" Additionally, the
state's opportunity to demonstrate that alleged sexual misconduct was
truly unforeseeable would safeguard the interests of diligent school
officials.
Schools are slowly beginning to adopt clear policies against peer
sexual harassment26' and implementing informational workshops 6
2
and effective counseling services for school children.2 o Training pro-
grams for school personnel are better enabling teachers and other su-
pervisory school officials to address peer sexual harassment and
accept responsibility for witnessed acts of misbehavior.2 4 By raising
awareness of both students and teachers, school officials are taking
affirmative steps to protect school children from peer sexual harass-
ment, but the progress is slow. 65
Unless school liability in cases of peer sexual harassment is ex-
panded to include a cause of action based solely on an abuse of special
relationships in the public school context, students only can hope that
"effective investigative and supervisory measures to prevent sexual
abuse" will be taken.266 The pervasiveness and intensity of the prob-
lem, 67 however, warrant that schools take affirmative steps "to pre-
259. School officials would assume an affirmative duty to protect school children
from reasonably foreseeable harms. See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 250-58 and accompanying text. See also Strauss, supra note
221, at 185 ("Swift action sends a strong message.").
261. For an example of a school policy prohibiting student sexual harassment, see
Stephen Buckley, Schools Drawing Line on Sexual Harassment: Principals Attend
Training Session on Policy, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1993, at Mi.
262. The AAUW has workshop materials to educate teachers and students about
what sexual harassment is and how to address it. Mann, supra note 31, at D26. The
focus of the materials is on the unwelcomeness and unwantedness of the misbehavior.
Workshop participants review words and conduct associated with sexual harassment.
Students are reminded that harassment degrades a person and makes her feel sad or
angry, while flirting makes a person feel good and is welcome. Id.
263. Melillo, supra note 254, at Z19 (noting that schools are beginning to offer
counseling services).
264. Brown, supra note 87, at Al (noting that schoolgirls are "becom[ing] more
aware of their rights and school officials [are becoming] more aware of their
responsibilities").
265. According to a study conducted by the Wellesley College Center of Research
on Women and the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, only eight percent of
4,200 girls surveyed revealed that their schools had a policy on sexual harassment.
Mann, supra note 31, at D26.
266. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Compensation for the Sexually Abused Student, 84 Educ.
L. Rep. 13, 13 (1993); see also D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Techni-
cal School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1383 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Sloviter, CJ., dissenting)
(noting that to conclude that a special relationship does not exist in peer sexual har-
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liberty short of incarceration or [institutionalization] w[ould] trigger the duty to pro-
tect"), cer. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
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vent as well as to react to [student] sexual harassment. '268
Recognition of the existence of a special relationship warranting state
affirmative protection in the public school context would provide the
necessary incentive for prevention.
CONCLUSION
Schools play an instrumental role in our children's development.
Through consciousness-raising and proper education, young Ameri-
cans can be instilled with strong values of equality and mutual respect.
Presently, however, peer sexual harassment is teaching its own lesson
in schools: that perpetrators are free to engage in unwelcomed sexual
behavior, and victims are powerless to prevent it. While sexual har-
assment poses a threat to all school children, female students suffer
the gravest consequences. The regularity of harassing behavior and
adult inattention to the problem have a scarring effect on female stu-
dents' "educational, emotional and behavioral" development.269 Un-
til a special relationship is found to exist between school officials and
school children, and schools are forced to take an active stance against
student sexual harassment, complaints will continue to be made but
not heard, and victims will struggle to accept the unacceptable.
268. Strauss, supra note 221, at 182.
269. AAUW Survey, supra note 10, at 21.
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